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Abstract—In wiretap model of secure communication, the
goal is to provide (asymptotic) perfect secrecy and reliability
over a noisy channel that is eavesdropped by an adversary
with unlimited computational power. This goal is achieved by
taking advantage of the channel noise and without requiring
a shared key. The model has attracted considerable attention
in recent years because it captures eavesdropping attack in
wireless communication. The wiretap adversary is a passive
eavesdropping adversary at the physical layer of communication.
In this paper we propose a model for adversarial wiretap
(AWTP) channel to capture active attacks at this layer. We
consider a (ρr, ρw) wiretap adversary who can see a fraction ρr,
and modify a fraction ρw, of the sent codeword. The code com-
ponents that are read and/or modified can be chosen adaptively,
and the subsets of read and modified components in general,
can be different. AWTP codes provide secrecy and reliability
for communication over these channels. We give security and
reliability definitions for these codes, and define secrecy capacity
of an AWTP channel. The paper has two main contributions.
First, we prove a tight upper bound on the rate of AWTP codes
for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels, and use the bound to derive the
secrecy capacity of the channel. Second, we give an explicit
construction for a perfectly secure capacity achieving AWTP code
family. We show that our AWTP model is a natural generalization
of Wyner’s wiretap models, and somewhat surprisingly, also
provides a generalization of a seemingly unrelated cryptographic
primitive, Secure Message Transmission (SMT). This relation
is used to derive a new (and the only known) bound on the
transmission rate of one round (ǫ, δ)-SMT protocols. We discuss
our results, give the relations with related primitives, and propose
directions for future work.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, active adversary, information
theoretic security, coding theory, secure message transmission
(SMT).
I. INTRODUCTION
WYNER’S pioneered wiretap channel model [54] wherenoise in the channel is used as a resource to provide
(asymptotic) perfect secrecy against a computationally un-
bounded adversary, without requiring a shared key. In Wyner’s
original wiretap model and its generalization [13], the sender
is connected to the receiver by a noisy channel referred to
as the main channel, and the eavesdropper obtains a noisy
view of the communication through a second noisy channel,
referred to as the wiretapper channel. The goal of the model
is to provide asymptotically reliable (noise free) and secure
(perfect secrecy) message transmission from Alice to Bob.
In a follow-up work Wyner (and Ozarow) [46] introduced
wiretap II model where the main channels is noiseless and the
wiretapper channel is an erasure channel where the erasures
are controlled by the adversary: the adversary can select
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the subset of codeword components that he/she would like
to see. The goal here is to provide perfect secrecy for the
communicants. Secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is the
fraction of a sent symbol that can be received with perfect
secrecy and reliability. Wyner derived secrecy capacity of
a degraded wiretap channel where the wiretapper channel
is a concatenation of the main channel and a second noisy
channel, and showed the existence of codes that achieve
secrecy capacity. Similar results for wiretap channel II, and
also general wiretap channel were obtained in [46] and [13],
respectively.
Wiretap model naturally captures physical layer wireless
communication where the sender’s transmission can be in-
tercepted (eavesdropped) by a third party who is within the
reception distance of the transmitter. There is a large body
of research [8], [10], [19], [19], [35], [38]–[44], [46] on
variations of the basic model including extending the goal of
communication to key agreement also. There have also been
numerous implementations of the system [4], [8].
Considering active adversaries in wiretap model is well
motivated by real life application scenarios. In wireless com-
munication it is relatively easy for an attacker to inject
signals in the channel resulting in the transmitted symbols
to be erased, or selectively modified [48]. Studying active
adversaries that model channel tampering is also important
for bringing wiretap model in line with cryptographic models
used for confidentiality (e.g. authenticated encryption). Recent
proposals [1], [9], [44] for physical layer active adversaries in
wiretap setting consider a general adversary modelled as an
arbitrary varying channel, but fall short on one or more of
the following, (i) considering adaptive adversaries that uses
its current knowledge to perform its next action, (ii) using a
strong definition of security, (iii) deriving an expression or a
tight upper-bound for secrecy capacity, and (iv) providing an
efficient explicit construction.
In this paper we propose an Adversarial Wiretap Channel
(AWTP Channel) model in which the adversary can adaptively
choose his/her view of the channel, and tamper with the
transmission over the channel using this view. Adversary’s ob-
servation and tampering strategies are arbitrary as long as the
total number of observed and tampered symbols stay within
specified limits. The model effectively replaces probabilistic
noise over the main channel in Wyner’s wiretap model with
adversarial noise, and for the wiretapper channel adopts the
Wyner’s wiretap II model, allowing the adversary to adaptively
select the symbols that they want to observe. The model thus
can be seen as extensions of Wyner’s wiretap and wiretap II
models both. In Section VI we will also show that this model
also generalizes the seemingly unrelated cryptographic model
2of Secure Message Transmission [26], [27], [34], [47], used
for networks. There are however subtle differences between
the two that will be further discussed in Section VI. We use a
definition of security and reliability that is in-line with related
cryptographic primitives such as SMT and also the security
definition of wiretap adversaries in [4].
We will derive an expression for upper bound on the rate
of AWTP codes and give an explicit construction for a code
that achieves the bound.
A. Our Results
1) AWTP Channel: An AWTP channel is specified by a
pair of parameters (ρr, ρw): for a codeword of length N ,
the adversary can choose a subset Sr of ρrN components of
the codeword to read, and a subset Sw of ρwN components
to write, and writing is by adding an error vector to the
codeword. The goal is to provide reliability and secrecy for
communication against the above adversary. Secrecy is defined
as the indistinguishability of the adversary’s view of the
communication for two messages chosen by the adversary,
and indistinguishability is measured by the statistical distance
between the two views. Reliability is given by the receiver’s
probability of correctly decoding a sent message, possibly
chosen by the adversary (See Definition 5). Perfect secrecy
and perfect reliability correspond to zero information leakage
and always correct recovery1 of the message by the receiver,
respectively. The ǫ-secrecy capacity Cǫ of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
is the highest possible information rate (number of message
bits divided by the number of communicated bits) with ǫ-
secrecy and the guarantee that the decoder error probability
asymptotically approaches zero. Secrecy capacity of a channel
gives the potentials of the channel for secure communication
and achieving this capacity with efficient construction, is the
ultimate goal of the system designer.
2) Adversarial Wiretap Codes (AWTP Code): An AWTP
code provides security and reliability for message transmission
over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels. An AWTP code is specified
by a triple (M, N,Σ), denoting the message space, code
length and alphabet set respectively, and a pair of algorithms
(AWTPenc(·),AWTPdec(·)) that are used for encoding and
decoding, respectively. Encoding is probabilistic and maps
a message m ∈ M to a codeword c ∈ C. Decoding is
deterministic and outputs a message that could be incorrect.
Decoding error is worst case and assumes that the adversary
uses their best strategy for choosing the message (message
distribution) and tampering with communication to make the
decoder output in error. An (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code guarantees that
the information leaked about the message (measured using
statistical distance) and the probability of decoding error are
upper bounded by ǫ and δ, respectively. The rate of an AWTP
code CN of length N , denoted by R(CN ), is defined as
R(CN ) = log |M|N log |Σ| . An AWTP code family C is a family
{CN}N∈N of AWTP codes indexed by the code length N .
The rate R(C) is achievable by a code family C, if for any
ξ > 0 there exists an N0 such that for all N ≥ N0, we have
1Note that similar to Hamming codes, because of the adversarial nature of
error, it is possible to require perfect decoding.
1
N log|Σ| |M| ≥ R(C) − ξ, and decoding error probability
satisfies δ ≤ ξ. The ǫ-secrecy capacity of AWTP channel,
denoted by Cǫ, is the largest achievable rate of all AWTP-
code families that provide ǫ-secrecy for the channel. (C0 for
perfect secrecy).
3) Rate Upper Bound of AWTP channel: We prove the
bound H(M) ≤ log |Σ|(1− ρr − ρw)N , for an arbitrary mes-
sage distribution with entropy H(M). Using uniform message
distribution, we obtain an upper bound on the rate of an (ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, that leads to the
following upper bound on the secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel,
Cǫ ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) (1)
For ǫ = 0, we obtain the upper bound, C0 ≤ 1− ρr − ρw, on
the secrecy capacity of perfectly secure AWTP code families
(Corollary 1), which is achieved by the construction in Section
V (Theorem 2), and we obtain the perfect secrecy capacity of
a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel,
C0 = 1− ρr − ρw (2)
The bound on C0 implies that perfect security for (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channels is possible only if, ρr + ρw < 1, indicating
a trade-off between read and write (adding noise) capabilities
of an AWTP adversary. In particular, when the adversary is
almost oblivious (ρr is small), the rate stays positive even
when the adversary writes over the large fraction < 1 − ρr
of the codeword, and on the other extreme when ρr is close
to 1, few < 1 − ρr corrupted symbols can be tolerated. In
general, the subset of components of a codeword that is either
read, or written to, cannot contribute to secure and reliable
transmission of information. Since the capacity result must
hold for all adversaries, that is all choices of Sr and Sw
(subject to the bound on the size), considering an adversary
that uses Sr ∩ Sw = ∅, results in the capacity to be less than
1−ρr−ρw. Oblivious writing adversaries have been previously
considered in Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes
[11] where the goal is to detect algebraic tampering. In AWTP
codes however, the aim is to correct errors and recover the sent
message.
4) A Capacity Achieving AWTP Code Family: We construct
a (0, δ)-AWTP code family C = {CN : N ∈ Z}, where N is
the code length, for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. For any small
ξ > 0, the code CN has rate R(CN ) = 1 − ρr − ρw − ξ;
the code alphabet size is |Σ| = O(q1/ξ2), and decoding error
probability is δ ≤ q
1
ξ−N
. The construction gives a construction
for a code family that achieves the capacity C0.
The construction uses three building blocks: Algebraic
Manipulation Detection Code (AMD code), Subspace Evasive
Sets, and Folded Reed-Solomon code (FRS code). An AMD
code [11] (Definition 1) is a randomized code that protects
against an oblivious adversary that “algebraically manipulates”
(adds error to) the AMD codeword; A (v, ℓ)-subspace evasive
sets is a subset S of a vector space Fnq with the property that,
any subset of dimension v has at most ℓ common elements
with S; An FRS code [31] is a special type of Reed-Solomon
3code that has efficient list decoding algorithm for errors up to
the list decoding capacity.
AWTP encoding algorithm of a message uses these three
building blocks as follows: the message is first encoded into an
AMD codeword; the resulting AMD codeword is then encoded
into a vector in a subspace evasive sets with appropriate
parameters; the resulting vector is finally encoded into a
codeword of the FRS code. AWTP decoding algorithm uses
inverse steps: it first uses the FRS decoder to output a list
of possible codewords which contains the correct codeword.
Using the decoding algorithm of FRS code [31], the list
size will be exponential in the code length N . Using the
intersection algorithm of the subspace evasive sets, the list
is pruned to a list of size at most ℓ that contains the correct
codeword. The decoder combines the above two steps and so
effectively avoids the generation of the exponential size list
in the FRS decode, which would result in inefficient decoder.
The final step uses the AMD code to find the correct coded
message, and outputs the correct message with probability
at least 1 − δ. We prove that with appropriate choices of
parameters, the rate of the code family meets the rate upper
bound of the of (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels with equality, and
so the family is capacity achieving.
5) Relations with SMT and AMD codes: AWTP model
of secure and reliable communication over adversarially con-
trolled channels, is closely related to 1-round SMT [21], a
model proposed for secure and reliable communication in
networks. In SMT setting Alice is connected to Bob through
a set of N node disjoint paths (wires) in a network, t of
which are controlled by a Byzantine adversary. The goal of
an SMT protocol is to provide reliability and privacy for
communication: an (ǫ, δ)-SMT ensures that the privacy loss
(indistinguishability based) is bounded by ǫ, and the probabil-
ity of failing to decode the message is bounded by δ [34].
A notable difference between an AWTP channel adversary
and an SMT adversary is that, in the former error is added
to the codeword while in the latter, it is a replacement error
and allows the adversary to replace what is sent over a wire
with its own adversarial choices. In Section VI, we consider
the relationship between the two primitives, and in particular
show how the results in one, can give results for the other.
The relationship also suggests a new efficiency measure for
SMT systems using information rate of a family.
B. Related Work
Wiretap model and its extensions has attracted much atten-
tion in recent years. There is a large body of excellent works
on extensions of wiretap model [10], [13], [35], [41], [43],
[46], construction of capacity achieving codes [4], [32], and
implementation of codes in practice [6], [8] . We only consider
the works that are directly related to this work. Considering
adversarial control in wiretap channel dates back to Wyner
wiretap II [46] model in which the adversary can select their
view of the communication. The adversary however, does
not modify the transmission over the main channel which
is assumed noise-free. Physical layer active adversaries for
wiretap channels that tamper with the transmission, have
been considered more recently [1], [9], [44]. These works
model wiretap channels under active attack, as an arbitrarily
varying channel. An arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) [2],
[5], [7], [18] is specified by two finite sets X and Y of
input and output alphabets, a finite set A of channel states,
and a set of channels specified by transition probabilities
Pr(y|x, a), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, a ∈ A. The channel state in general
varies with each channel use (possibly with memory) and,
Pr(yn|xn, an) = Πni=1Pr(yi|xi, ai)
where an = (a1 · · · an), an ∈ An, is the sequence of channel
states. An arbitrarily varying wiretap channels (AVWC) is
specified by an input alphabet set X , two sets of output
alphabets, Y and Z , representing the legitimate receiver’s
and the wiretapper’s input values, respectively, and a fam-
ily of channels, each specified with a transition probability
Pr(y, z|x, a), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, a ∈ A) indexed by the
channel state a. In [44], ta jammer chooses the state ai (jam-
ming signal) independent of the eavesdroppers’ observation z.
Transmitter and receiver know the state space but not the state
chosen by the adversary.
The message is chosen randomly, with uniform distribution,
from the message space. Encoding and decoding is random-
ized; that is the system uses a family of encoder and decoder
pairs, and the pair used by the sender and receiver is specified
by a random value (also called key) that is known to the
eavesdropper but not the jammer. The family of the codes is
known to the jammer. Security is measured by the rate of the
mutual information between the message and the adversary’s
observation, and reliability for a single encoder and decoder
is in terms of the expected error probability over all messages.
For randomized codes security and reliability are averaged
over all realizations of the code.
Authors defined randomized-code secrecy capacity of AVWP
channels and derived an upper bound for that. They also
obtained the capacity for the special case of strongly degraded
with independent states where certain Markov chains hold
among X,Y and Z , and the set of states A is decomposable
as A = Ay ×Az and states of the receiver’s channel and the
eavesdroppers channels are selected independently.
In summary, the model (i) assumes common randomness
between the sender and the receiver that is unknown to the
jammer, but is known to the eavesdropper, (ii) uses weak
definition of secrecy, and (iii) the jammer’s corruption does
not depend on the eavesdropper view. In [5], [9] these results
are strengthened. These works both use a strong definition of
secrecy using total mutual information (instead of rate), and
[9] uses the AVWC model and analyzes active adversaries that
exploit common randomness.
Our adversarial channel model can be seen as a special
class of arbitrarily varying channel. For this class we can
remove some of the restrictions of the above line of work.
More specifically, (i) we do not assume shared randomness
between the sender and the receiver, (ii) we consider an
integrated adaptive eavesdropping and jamming adversary and
assume that to corrupt the next symbol, the adversary uses
all its knowledge up to that point; (iii) we allow adversary to
choose the message distribution and so the error is worst case;
4and finally (iv) the secrecy measure in our case is in terms
of statistical distance between the adversary’s views of two
adversarially chosen messages. We note that in [9], secrecy
is measured as the mutual information of a random message
(uniform distribution on messages) and the adversary’s view.
Our security definition using statistical distance is equivalent to
the mutual information security when the message distribution
is adversarially chosen [4].
In [1] wiretap II model is extended to include an active
adversary, using two types of corruption. In the first one the
adversary erases symbols that are observed, and in the second,
corrupts them. Authors give constructions that achieve good
rates. The adversary’s corruption capability in our work is
more general (adversary is more powerful). No other com-
parison can be made because of insufficient details.
Wyner [54] quantifies security of the system using the
adversary’s equivocation defined as the average (per message
symbol) uncertainty about the message, given the adversary’s
view of the sent codeword. Strengthening this security defini-
tion has been considered in [4], [10], [32], [42]. In [4], the
relationship among security notions used for wiretap channels
is studied, and it is also shown that distinguishability based
definition using statistical distance is equivalent to a security
notion that is called mutual information security. This is a
stronger notion compared to the strong security notion used
in [42], with the difference being that the adversary chooses
the message distribution.
Adversarial channels have been widely studied in literature
[18], [30], [37], with [36] providing a comprehensive survey.
An adversarial channel closely related to this work is limited
view (LV) adversary channel [50], [51]. An LV adversary
power is identical to the adversary in AWTP channel but
the goal of communication in the former is reliability, while
transmission over AWTP channels requires reliability and
secrecy both.
Computationally limited active adversariy at network layer
of communication, has been considered in [20], [33], [41],
[43], [49]. This adversary can tamper with the whole message,
and to provide protection, access to resources such as shared
randomness [28], [52], close secrets [33], or extra channels
[45], is required. The adversary in AWTP setting is at physical
layer of communication, and the only advantage of communi-
cants over the adversary is limited access of the adversary to
the channel.
In all above models, the reliability goal is to correctly
recover the sent message. A less demanding reliability goal
in detection of errors. Adversarial tampering by an adversary
that cannot “see” the encoded message, has been considered
in the context of AMD codes [11]. AMD codes with strong
security, are randomized codes that detect algebraic manipu-
lation resulting from the addition of an arbitrary error vector.
Weak AMD codes are deterministic and use the message
randomness to provide protection. AMD codes with leakage
[3] allow the adversary to “see” a fraction of the codeword.
The writing ability of the adversary however is unrestricted.
This is possible because the goal of the encoding is to
detect tampering, while in AWTP model, the goal is message
recovery and so the corruption must be limited.
C. Discussion and Future Work
Providing security against a computationally unlimited ad-
versary and without assuming a shared key, requires limiting
adversary’s physical access to the information. The bound on
the write ability of the adversary captures limitations of the
adversary’s transmitting power, and the complexity of effecting
symbol change [48] in real systems. The bound on the read
ability captures limited physical access to sent symbols due to
the inadequacy of the adversary’s receiver to perfectly decode
all the sent symbols.
A number of results in this paper can be improved. Con-
struction of capacity achieving AWTP codes for ǫ > 0, and
construction of AWTP code for constant size alphabets, and
in particular F2, remain open problems.
Organization: Section 2 provides background. In Section 3, we
introduce AWTP channels and codes. Section 4 is on bounds
and Section 5 gives the construction. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use calligraphic symbols X to denote sets, Pr(X) to de-
note a probability distribution over X , and X to denote a ran-
dom variable that takes values from X with probability Pr(X).
The conditional probability given an events E is Pr[X = x|E].
log(·) is logarithm in base two. Shannon entropy of a random
variable X is, H(X) = −
∑
x Pr(x) logPr(x), and conditional
entropy of a random variable X given Y is defined by,
H(X |Y ) = −
∑
x,y Pr(x, y) logPr(x|y). Statistical distance
between two random variables X1, X2 defined over the same
set is given by SD(X1, X2) = 12
∑
x |Pr[X1 = x]−Pr[X2 =
x]|. Mutual information between random variables X and Y
is given by, I(X,Y ) = H(X) − H(X |Y ). For a vector e,
Hamming weight of a vector e is denoted by be wt(e).
1) Algebraic Manipulation Detection Code (AMD code):
Consider a storage device Σ(G) that holds an element x from a
group G. The storage Σ(G) is private but can be manipulated
by the adversary by adding ∆ ∈ G. AMD codes allow the
manipulation to be detected.
Definition 1 (AMD Code [11]): An (X ,G, δ)-Algebraic
Manipulation Detection code ((X ,G, δ)-AMD code)
consists of two algorithms (AMDenc,AMDdec). Encoding,
AMDenc : X → G, is probabilistic and maps an element of
a set X to an element of an additive group G. Decoding,
AMDdec : G → X ∪{⊥}, is deterministic and for any x ∈ X ,
we have AMDdec(AMDenc(x)) = x. Security of AMD codes
is defined by requiring,
Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(x) + ∆) ∈ {x,⊥}] ≤ δ, (3)
for all x ∈ X ,∆ ∈ G.
An AMD code is systematic if the encoding has the form
AMDenc : X → X ×G1×G2, and x→ (x, r, t = f(x, r)), for
some function f and r $← G1. The decoding function results
in AMDdec(x, r, t) = x, if and only if t = f(x, r), and ⊥
otherwise.
We use the systematic AMD code in [11] over an extension
field. Let φ be a bijection between vectors v of length N over
Fq, and elements of FqN , and let d be an integer such that
5d + 2 is not divisible by q. Define the function AMDenc :
FdqN → F
d
qN × FqN × FqN as, AMDenc(x) = (x, r, f(x, r))
where,
f(x, r) = φ−1
(
φ(r)d+2 +
d∑
i=1
φ(xi)φ(r)
i
)
mod qN
Lemma 1: For the AMD code above, the success chance of
an adversary, that has no access to the codeword (x, r, t), in
constructing a new codeword (x′, r′, t′) = (x′ = x+∆x, r′ =
r +∆r, t′ = t +∆t), that satisfies t′ = f(x′, r′), is no more
than d+1qN .
Proof of this Lemma is the direct application of Theorem
2 in [11], when the underlying field is FqN .
2) Subspace Evasive Sets: Subspace evasive sets are used
to reduce the list size of list decodable code [22].
Definition 2 (Subspace Evasive Sets [22], [31]): Let S ⊂
Fnq . We say S is a (v, ℓ)-subspace evasive if for all v-
dimensional affine subspaces H ⊂ Fnq , we have |S ∩ H| ≤ ℓ.
Dvir et al. [22] gave an efficient explicit construction of
subspace evasive sets S ⊂ Fnq , with an efficient intersection
algorithm that computes S∩H for any v-dimensional subspace
H ⊂ Fnq .
A v × w matrix is called strongly-regular if all its r × r
minors are regular (have non-zero determinant) for all 1 ≤
r ≤ v.
Lemma 2: (Theorem 3.2 [22]) Let v ≥ 1, ε > 0 and F be a
finite field. Let w = v/ε and, assume w divides n. Let A be a
v×w matrix with coefficients in F which is strongly-regular.
Let d1 > · · · > dw be integers. For i ∈ [v] let,
fi(x1, · · · , xw) =
w∑
j=1
Ai,jx
dj
j
and define the subspace evasive set S ∈ Fn to be (n/w) times
cartesian product of VF(f1, · · · , fv) ⊂ Fw. That is,
S = VF(f1, · · · , fv)× · · · ×VF(f1, · · · , fv)
= {x ∈ Fn : fi(xtw+1, · · · , xtw+w) = 0,
∀0 ≤ t < n/w, 1 ≤ i ≤ v}
Then S is (v, vD·v log log v)-subspace evasive set, and |S| =
|F|(1−ε)n.
To use a subspace evasive sets for efficient list decoding,
two efficient algorithms are needed: (i) a bijection mapping
that maps messages that are elements of a space Fn1 into
the subspace evasive set S, and an intersection algorithm that
computes the intersection between S and any subspace H with
dimension at most v. The lemmas below show the existence
of these two algorithms for the subspace evasive set above.
Lemma 3: [22] Let v, w, n1 ∈ N, b = n1w−v , n = bw,
and Fq be a finite field. For any vector v ∈ Fn1q , there is
a bijection which maps v into an element of the subspace
evasive set S ⊂ Fnq . That is, SE : v → s ∈ S. The encoding
algorithm is Poly(n).
Lemma 4: [22] Let S ⊂ Fnq be the (v, ℓ)-subspace evasive
sets (described above). Then there exists an algorithm that,
given a basis for anyH, outputs S∩H in time Poly(vv·log log v).
3) Folded Reed-Solomon Code (FRS code): An error cor-
recting code C over Fq is a subspace of FNq . The rate of
the code is log2 |C|/N . A code C of length N and rate
R is (ρ, ℓList)-list decodable if the number of codewords
within distance ρN from any received word is at most ℓList.
List decodable codes can correct up to 1 − R fraction of
errors in a codeword, which is twice that of unique decoding.
This is however at the cost of outputting a list of possible
sent codewords (messages). Construction of good codes with
efficient list decoding algorithms has been an active research
area. An explicit construction of a list decodable code that
achieves the list decoding capacity ρ = 1 − R, is given
by Guruswami et al. [31]. The code is called Folded Reed-
Solomon code (FRS code), and can be seen as a Reed-Solomon
code with extra structure. The code has polynomial time
encoding and list decoding algorithms.
Definition 3: [31] A u-Folded Reed-Solomon code is an
error correcting code with block length N over Fuq where q >
Nu. The message of an FRS code is written as a polynomial
f(x) with degree k over Fq . The FRS codeword corresponding
to the message is a vector over Fuq where each component is
a u-tuple (f(γju), f(γju+1), · · · , f(γju+u−1)), 0 ≤ j < N ,
and γ is a generator of F∗q , the multiplicative group of Fq. A
codeword of a u-folded Reed-Solomon code of length N is
in one-to-one correspondence with a codeword c of a Reed-
Solomon code of length uN , and is obtained by grouping
together u consecutive components of c. We use FRSenc to
denote the encoding algorithm of the FRS code. u is called
the folding parameter of the FRS code.
We will use the linear algebraic FRS decoding algorithm
of these codes [31].
Lemma 5: [31] For a Folded Reed-Solomon code of block
length N and rate R = kuN , the following holds for all integers
1 ≤ v ≤ u. Given a received word y ∈ (Fuq )N agreeing with
c in at least a fraction,
N − ρN > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uR
u− v + 1
)
one can compute a matrix M ∈ Fk×(v−1)q and a vector z ∈ Fkq ,
such that the message polynomials f ∈ Fq[X ] in the decoded
list are contained in the affine space Mb+ z for b ∈ Fv−1q in
O((Nu log q)2) time.
III. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the following scenario. Alice wants to a send
messages m ∈ M, reliably and securely to Bob, over a
communication channel that is partially controlled by an
adversary, Eve. Let Σ denote the channel alphabet, and C
be a code, C ⊂ ΣN , together with a probabilistic encoder,
AWTPenc : M × R → C, and a deterministic decoder,
AWTPdec : ΣN → M. The encoder takes a message m
and a random string rS
$
← R and outputs a codeword
c = AWTPenc(m, rS). The codewords associated with a
message m and different rS , define a random variable over
C. Alice will use the encoding algorithm and for a message
m (also referred to as the information ), generates a codeword
AWTPenc(m). The adversary interacts with the codeword as
6described below, resulting Bob to receive a corrupted word
y 6= c. Bob uses the decoding algorithm to recover the
message.
A. Adversarial Wiretap: Channel and Code
Let [N ] = {1, · · · , N}, and Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrN} ⊆ [N ]
and Sw = {j1, · · · , jρwN} ⊆ [N ], denote two subsets of the
N coordinates, and for a vector x ∈ ΣN , SUPP(x) denote the
set of coordinates where xi is non-zero.
Definition 4: A (ρr, ρw)-Adversarial Wiretap channel (or
a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel), is an adversarially corrupted com-
munication channel between Alice and Bob, such that it is
(partially) controlled by the adversary Eve with two capabili-
ties: Reading and Writing. For a codeword of length N , Eve
can do the following.
• Reading (also called Eavesdropping): Eve can select a
subset Sr ⊆ [N ] of size at most ρrN and read the
components of the sent codeword c, on positions asso-
ciated with Sr. Eve’s view of the codeword is given by,
ViewA(AWTPenc(m, rS), rA) = {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN }, and
consists of all the components that are read (observed).
• Writing (also called Jamming): Eve can choose a subset
Sw ⊆ [N ] of size at most ρwN , for “writing”. This is by
adding an error vector e to vector c, where the addition
is component-wise over Σ. It holds that SUPP(e) ⊆ Sw.
The corrupted components of c are {yj1 , · · · , yjρwN } and
yjℓ = cjℓ + ejℓ . The error e is generated according to the
Eve’s best strategy for making Bob’s decoder to output
in error.
We assume the adversary is adaptive and can select compo-
nents of the sent codeword for reading and writing one by
one, at each step using their knowledge of the codeword at
that time.
Let S = Sr ∪ Sw denote the set of codeword components
that the adversary either reads, or writes to. We have |S| =
ρN , and ρ ≤ ρr + ρw.
An AWTP channel is called restricted if, Sr = Sw.
Restricted AWTP channel are a special type of AWTP channel
where the adversary is limited in its selection of Sr and Sw,
and so is a weaker type of AWTP channel.
Alice and Bob will use an Adversarial Wiretap Code to pro-
vide secure and reliable communication over AWTP channel.
Definition 5: An (ǫ, δ)-Adversarial Wiretap Code ((ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code) over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, consists of a
randomized encoding AWTPenc : M × R → C, from the
message space M to a code C, and a deterministic decoding
algorithm AWTPdec : ΣN → M. The code guarantees the
following two properties:
• Secrecy: For any two messages m1,m2 ∈ M, the
statistical distance between the adversary’s views, when
the same randomness rA is used by the adversary, is
bounded by ǫ. That is,
Advds(AWTPenc,ViewA)
△
=
max
m0,m1
SD(ViewA(AWTPenc(m1), rA),
ViewA(AWTPenc(m2), rA)) ≤ ǫ
• Reliability: For any message m that is encoded to c by
the sender, and corrupted to y = c + e by the (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel, the probability that the receiver outputs
the correct information m is at least 1− δ. That is,
Pr(MS 6= MR) ≤ δ
where the probability is over the choice of the message,
randomness of the communicants and the adversary.
The AWTP code is perfectly secure if ǫ = 0.
For ǫ > 0, an ǫ-secure AWTP code family Cǫ, is a family
{CN}N∈N of (ǫ, δ)-AWTP codes, indexed by N ∈ N, for a
(ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. When ǫ = 0, the family is called a
perfectly secure AWTP code family.
In the following, when ǫ 6= 0, we omit ǫ and simply write
C to denote, Cǫ.
Definition 6: For a family C of (ǫ, δ)-AWTP codes the rate
R(C) is achievable if for any ξ, there exists N0 such that for
any N ≥ N0, we have, 1N log|Σ| |M| ≥ R(C) − ξ, and the
decoding error probability satisfies, Pr(MS 6= MR) ≤ ξ.
To define secrecy capacity of an AWTP channel, we will
use achievable rate of a code family for the channel.
Definition 7: The ǫ-secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
channel denoted by Cǫ, is the largest achievable rate of all
AWTP-code families C that provide ǫ-secrecy for the channel.
The perfect secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel is
denoted by C0, and is the highest achievable rate of perfectly
secure AWTP-code families for the channel.
IV. A BOUND ON THE RATE OF (ǫ, δ)-AWTP CODES
We derive an upper bound on the rate of AWTP codes, and
use it to find the secrecy capacity of AWTP channels.
The bound is derived on the rate of an arbitrary code when
the adversary uses a special strategy, given below. Since the
strategy can always be used, it follows that the code rate
cannot be higher than the bound. The adversary’s strategy is
a probabilistic strategy.
1) Before the start of the transmission, the adversary selects
two pairs of read and write sets, {Sir, Siw}, i = 1, 2,
satisfying S1r ∩ S2w = ∅.
The adversary then selects one of the two pairs with
probability 1/2; that is, Pr(S1r , S1w) = Pr(S2r , S2w) = 12 .
The set sizes satisfy the following: for i = 1, 2, we have
|Sir| = ρrN , |S
i
w| = ρwN , and |Sir ∪ Siw| = ρN , where
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
2) For the chosen read and write pair, {Sir, Siw}, the ad-
versary, (i) reads the ρrN components of the codeword
corresponding to the subset Sir, (ii) chooses an error
vector Ei ∈ ΣρwN randomly with uniform distribution,
and adds it component-wise to the codeword compo-
nents corresponding to Siw.
3) The adversary chooses the uniform distribution on the
message space.
We associate a random variable Ci to the ith component of
an (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code. For i = 1, 2, let CSir and CSiw be the
components of a codeword on the sets Sir Siw, respectively.
Let Y denote the word that Bob receives.
7In the following we will derive the secrecy capacity, Cǫ, of
a (ρr, ρw) AWTP channel.
Theorem 1: The upper bound on the secrecy capacity of
AWTP code family over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel is,
Cǫ ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
)
We first prove an upper-bound on the rate of an (ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code (Lemma (8)), and then extend the bound to the
achievable rate of a code family, and so the secrecy capacity of
the channel. To prove the bound on the rate of a code, we prove
two lemmas that use the secrecy and reliability guarantees of
the code, respectively, and use them to prove the bound on the
rate of the code.
Lemma 6: An (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
channel satisfies,
H(M)− H(M |CS1r ) ≤ 2ǫρrN log
|Σ|
ǫ
Proof: From the definition of ǫ-secrecy we have,
Advds(AWTPenc,ViewA)
=
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m0)− Pr(cS1r |m1)|
+
1
2
∑
cS2r
|Pr(cS2r |m0)− Pr(cS2r |m1)| ≤ ǫ
(4)
This implies that for any pair of messages, m0,m1 ∈M, we
have,
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m0)− Pr(cS1r |m1)| ≤ ǫ
and so it follows that,
SD(PCS1rM
, PCS1r
PM )
=
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m)− Pr(cS1r )|
=
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m)−
∑
m′∈M
Pr(cS1r |m
′)Pr(m′)|
=
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m)−
∑
m′∈M
Pr(cS1r |m
′)Pr(m′)|
≤
∑
m∈M
Pr(m)
1
2
∑
cS1r
|Pr(cS1r |m)−
∑
m′∈M
Pr(cS1r |m
′)|
≤
∑
m∈M
Pr(m)ǫ
= ǫ
By Theorem 17.3.3 (Page 370, [17]), for sufficiently small ǫ
I(M,CS1r )
≤ 2SD(PCS1rM
, PCS1r
PM ) log
|Σ|ρrN
SD(PCS1rM
, PCS1r
PM )
≤ 2ǫρrN log
|Σ|
ǫ
Lemma 7: An (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
channel, satisfies,
H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) ≤ H(δ) + δN log |Σ|
Proof: From Fano’s inequality (Theorem 2.10.1, Page 38,
[17]), the decoding error probability δ, implies,
H(M |Y ) ≤ H(δ) + δN log |Σ|
We have Pr(M) = Pr(MS1rS1w) + Pr(MS2rS2w) and so,
H(M |Y ) = H(MS1rS
1
w|Y ) + H(MS
2
rS
2
w|Y )
= H(S1rS
1
w|Y )H(M |Y S
1
rS
1
w) + H(S
2
rS
2
w|Y )H(M |Y S
2
rS
2
w)
(1)
= H(S1rS
1
w)H(M |Y S
1
rS
1
w) + H(S
2
rS
2
w)H(M |Y S
2
rS
2
w)
(2)
=
1
2
H(M |Y S1rS
1
w) +
1
2
H(M |Y S2rS
2
w)
(1) is because {Sir, Siw} are selected before transmission starts,
and independent of Y ; (2) is from H(S1rS1w) = 12 . Since
H(M |Y S1rS
1
w) ≥ 0, we have,
H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) ≤ 2H(δ) + 2δN log |Σ|
We denote the (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code with length N as CN , and
the rate of (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code as R(CN ).
Lemma 8: The upper bound of rate of (ǫ, δ) AWTP code
CN over (ρr, ρw) AWTP channel is,
R(CN ) ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 4H(δ) + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
)
Proof: We have,
H(M) = I(M ;Y S2rS
2
w) + H(M |Y S
2
rS
2
w)
− I(M ;CS1r ) + I(M ;CS1r )
≤ I(M ;Y CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− I(M ;CS1r )
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
(1)
= I(M ;Y CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− I(M ;CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
= I(M ;Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) + H(M |Y S
2
rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
= H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− H(Y |MCS1rS
2
rS
2
w)
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
≤ H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− H(Y |MCS1rCS
2
rS
2
w)
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
(2)
≤ H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− H(E2|MCS1rCS
2
rS
2
w)
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r )
(3)
= H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− H(E2|S
2
rS
2
w)
+ H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) + I(M ;CS1r ) (5)
(1) is from {S2r , S2w} → CS1r → M from which it follows
that Pr(M |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) = Pr(M |CS1r ). The Markov chain
holds because knowledge of CS1r implies that subset pair
{S1r , S
1
w} is used, and so {S2r , S2w} does not provide extra
information; (2) is by noting that E2 = Y −C if the adversary
selects {S2r , S2w}. (3) is from the Markov chain MCS1rC →
8{S2r , S
2
w} → E2, which implies I(MCS1rC;E2|S
2
rS
2
w) =
H(E2|S2rS
2
w)− H(E2|MCS1rCS
2
rS
2
w) = 0.
So we have
H(M) ≤ H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)− H(E2|S
2
rS
2
w) + H(M |Y S
2
rS
2
w)
+ I(M ;CS1r )
We can upper bound H(M) by bounding the four terms on
the right hand side of the inequality.
First, we have the bound, H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) ≤ (1 −
ρr)N log |Σ|. Let [N ]\S1r be the subset of [N ] that is not in S1r ,
and Y[N ]\S1r be the components of Y on the set [N ]\S
1
r . Since
S1r ∩ S
2
w = ∅, if the adversary selects the set pair {S2r , S2w},
the components of Y on the set S1r will not have error and
will be equal to the components of C on S1r . That is,
H(YS1r |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) = 0 (6)
So we have,
H(Y |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) = H(YS1rY[N ]\S1r |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w)
= H(YS1r |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) + H(Y[N ]\S1r |CS1rYS1rS
2
rS
2
w)
≤ H(YS1r |CS1rS
2
rS
2
w) + H(Y[N ]\S1r )
≤ log |Y[N ]\S1r |
≤ (1− ρr)N log |Σ|
To bound the second item notice that if the adversary selects
{S2r , S
2
w}, E2 is uniformly distributed and so,
H(E2|S
2
rS
2
w) = ρwN log |Σ| (7)
From Lemma 6 and 7, we also have the bounds
H(M |Y S2rS
2
w) ≤ 2H(δ) + 2δN log |Σ| and H(M) −
H(M |CS1r ) ≤ 2ǫρrN log
|Σ|
ǫ . So the upper bound on H(M)
is,
H(M) ≤(1− ρr − ρw)N log |Σ|+ 2H(δ) + 2δN log |Σ|
+ 2ǫρrN log
|Σ|
ǫ
Since the message is uniformly distributed, we have H(M) =
log |M|. Since for 0 < δ < 12 it holds δ < H(δ), the upper
bound on the rate of an AWTP code of length N is obtained
by usingt, H(δ) + δN log |Σ| ≤ 2H(δ)N log |Σ|. That is,
R(CN ) =
log |M|
N log |Σ|
≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 4H(δ)
The following is the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: (Theorem 1) Proof is by contradiction. Suppose
there is a code family C with achievable rate Cǫ = 1 − ρr −
ρw+2ǫρr(1+log|Σ|
1
ǫ )+ξˆ, for some small constant 0 < ξˆ <
1
2 .
Let H(p0) = ξˆ8 . For any ξˆ
′ ≤ p0, we have 4H(ξˆ′) ≤ ξˆ2 and
ξˆ′ ≤ H(ξˆ′) ≤ ξˆ8 . From Definition 6, for any 0 < ξˆ
′ ≤ p0, there
is an N0 such that for any N > N0, we have δ < ξˆ′ and,
R(CN ) ≥ Cǫ − ξˆ′
= 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + ξˆ − ξˆ′
(1)
= 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 4H(δ) +
ξˆ
2
− ξˆ′
(2)
> 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 4H(δ)
(1) is from H(δ) ≤ H(ξˆ′) < ξˆ8 ; (2) is from ξˆ′ < ξˆ2 .
This contradicts the bound on R(CN ) in Lemma 8, and so,
Cǫ ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
)
For ǫ = 0, we have the upper bound on the achievable rate
of an AWTP code family with perfect secrecy.
Corollary 1: The upper bound on the achievable rate of
a perfectly secure AWTP code family for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
channel is,
C0 ≤ 1− ρr − ρw
A. Restricted AWTP channels
Note that the above proof is general in the sense that the
sets Sr and Sw can have nonempty intersection. Restricted
channels limit the adversary to the case that Sr = Sw. Using
the same approach, we can derive the following bounds on C0
and Cǫ.
Corollary 2: The upper bound of rate of restricted-AWTP
code family with over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel is, for a per-
fectly secure code family,
C0 ≤ 1− ρr − ρw
and for an ǫ-secure code family,
Cǫ ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρr(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
)
We note that a more direct proof of Theorem 1 is to use an
adversary strategy in which Sr ∩ Sw = ∅. However this proof
cannot be used for the subclass of restricted AWTP because,
for this subclass this is not a valid adversarial strategy. The
above proof with randomized adversarial strategy removes this
restriction and allows us to apply the same proof method for
restricted AWTP channels.
V. AWTP CODE CONSTRUCTION
Let q to be a prime satisfying, q > Nu. A message is an
element of M = FuRNq , given by m = {m1, · · · ,muRN} ∈
M, and mi ∈ Fq .
We construct a (0, δ)–AWTP code family C0 = {CN}N∈N,
for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. The construction uses, (i) an
FRS code, (ii) an AMD code and, (iii) a subset evasive sets,
with the following parameters .
1) A u-Folded RS-codes of length N over Fq, with a linear
algebraic decoder [31] using the decoding parameter v.
Let ξ1 = ξ/13. Parameters of the FRS code are chosen
as, (i) folding parameter u = ξ−21 , (i) decoding parame-
ter v = ξ−11 , (iii) the length N ≥ (1/ξ1)D/ξ1 log log 1/ξ1 ,
9and (iv) the field size satisfying q > Nu, and condition
2 of Theorem 3.2 in [22]. This latter condition on q is
required for efficient injective mapping into the subset
evasive set, and hence efficient encoding and decoding.
2) Assume, for simplicity, that uR is an integer. (The
argument can straighforwardly be extended to the case
that this condition does not hold.) The AMD code will
be the code in Section II-1, and will have message
space X = FuRNq , codeword space G = FuRN+2q , and
δ ≤ uR+1qN .
3) We will use a (v, vD·v·log log v)- subspace evasive sets S,
that is a subset of size qn1 , in Fnq , using the construction
in Theorem 3.2 in [22]. Here D is a constant (See
Claim 4.3 in [22]), and the bound vD·v·log log v on the
intersection list size of a v-dimensional affine subspace
with S, follows from Claim 4.3 and 3.3 in [22].
The parameters n and n1 are chosen as shown below,
to achieve a rate R(CN ) = 1− ρr − ρw − ξ.
Let w = v2 and b = ⌈uRN+2Nw−v ⌉. Then we choose n1 =
(w − v)b, n = wb.
Note that n1 is almost the same as the codeword length
of the AMD code, i.e. (uR+ 2)N . Also, v = ξ−11 and,
n1 =
w − v
w
n =
v2 − v
v2
n = (1−
1
v
)n = (1 − ξ1)n
and so the size of S satisfies condition 2 in Theorem
3.2 in [22].
We use γ to denote a primitive element of Fq .
Let AWTPencN and AWTPdecN , be the encoding and
decoding algorithms of the code, respectively.
The constructions of the encoder and the decoder of CN
are given in Figure V.
Figure V
Encoding: Alice does the following:
1) Interpret an information block m of length uRN ,
as a vector x ∈ FuRqN . Generate a random vector
r ∈ FqN and use it to find the codeword associated
with x using the AMD construction in section II-1,
AMDenc(x) = (x, r, t). The AMD codeword is of
length uRN + 2N over Fq .
2) Extend the AMD codeword to length n1 by append-
ing zeros from Fq . Encode the AMD codeword to
an element s ∈ S, using the bijection mapping of
the subspace evasive sets ,
s = SE(x, r, t||0, · · · , 0)
Note that elements of S are from Fnq and so, s has
length n.
3) Append a random vector a = (a1 · · · auρrN ) ∈
FuρrNq to s and form the vector that will be the
message of the FRS code. Use s and a as the
coefficients of the FRS codeword polynomial, f(x),
over Fq . That is (f0, · · · , fk−1) = (s||a). We have
k = deg(f) + 1 = n+ uρrN .
4) Use FRSenc to construct the FRS codeword
c = FRSenc(f(X)) = (c1, · · · , cN ), with
ci = (f(γ
i(u−1)), · · · , f(γiu−1)) ∈ Fuq , for i =
1, · · · , N .
Decoding: Bob does the following:
1) Let y = c + e, and wH(e) ≤ ρwN . Let, y =
(y1, · · · , yN ) and yi = (yi,1, · · · , yi,u) for i =
1, · · · , N .
Use the FRS (linear algebraic) decoding algorithm
FRSdec(y) to output a matrix M ∈ Fk×vq , and a
vector z ∈ Fkq , such that the decoder output list
is of the form, LList = Mb + z. M has k(= n +
uρrN) rows, each giving a component of the output
vector as a linear combination of (b1, · · · , bv), and
the corresponding component of z.
2) Let H denote the vector space spanned by the first
n equations. That is
H = Mn×vb+ zn,b ∈ F
v
q ,
where Mn×v is the first n rows of the submatrix
of M and zn is the first n elements of z.
The AWTP decoder calculates the intersection S∩H
and outputs a list L of size at most vD·v·log log v.
Each codeword is parsed and for each si ∈ L a
potential AMD codeword (xi, ri, ti) is generated.
For each potential AMD codeword (xi, ri, ti), the
AMDdec checks if, ti = f(xi, ri). If there is a
unique valid AMD codeword in the output list of
the FRS decoder, the AWTP decoder outputs the
first uRN components of x as the correct message
m. Otherwise, Bob randomly selects and outputs a
codeword of the AMD code.
We prove secrecy and reliability of the above code, and
derive the rate of the AWTP code family.
Lemma 9 (Secrecy): The AWTP code C above provides
perfect security for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that an AWTP codeword
sent over a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel does not leak any infor-
mation about the encoded element in subspace evasive sets,
which includes the message sent by Alice.
The codeword polynomial is of degree n+ uρrN − 1 and
so has n + uρrN coefficients, uρrN of which are randomly
chosen. The adversary sees ρrN elements of Fuq , each corre-
sponding to a linear equation on the coefficients. This means
that the adversary has no information about the remaining n
coefficients corresponding to the message. The FRS coding
can be seen as coset coding in [46], and so inheriting the
security of these codes. Hence for an adversary observation
ViewA = {cj1 , · · · , cjρrN},
H(S|ViewA) = H(S)
where S is the element of the subspace evasive sets which is
the encoding from the message M .
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Lemma 10 (Reliability): i) Given N ≥ v2, the AWTP code
CN described above provides reliability for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
channel if the following holds:
ρw <
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
v
v−1 (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
. (8)
ii) The decoding error probability of AWTPdec is bounded
by δ ≤ v
D·v·log log v
qN .
Proof: i) FRS decoding algorithm FRSdec [31] requires,
N − ρwN > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uRFRS
u− v + 1
) (9)
The dimension of the FRS code is bounded by,
k = uRFRSN = uρrN + n
= uρrN + w⌈
uRN + 2N
w − v
⌉
(1)
≤ uρrN +
w
w − v
(uRN + 3N)
(10)
(1) is from N ≥ v2.
Thus, we have, uRFRS ≤ uρr+ ww−v (uR+3), and replacing
RFRS in the decoding condition for FRS code (9) gives,
ρw <
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
v
v−1 (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
ii) There is a decoding error if there are at least codewords
in the FRS decoder output list, that are AMD encodings of
two messages m′ 6= m.
First note that the correct message is always in the decoder
list. This is because the FRS decoder output, combined with
the subspace evasive sets intersection algorithm, gives all
codewords that are at distance at most ρwN from the received
word y, and, have messages that are elements of the subset
evasive set. This list includes the sent codeword as the message
m had been mapped to S; that is the information is first,
encoded using AMD coding (x, r, t) = AMDenc(m), and
then mapped to the subspace evasive sets,
SE(x, r, t||0, · · · , 0) ∈ L = S ∩ H and t = f(x, r),
and finally, encoded using FRS code. Hence the sent codeword
is in the output list of the FRS decoder.
Next, we show that the probability that the message asso-
ciated with any other codeword in the decoder list is a valid
AMD codeword, is small. That is,
Pr([SE(x′, r′, t′) ∈ S ∩ H] ∧ [t′ = f(x′, r′)]) ≤
uR+ 1
qN
From Lemma 9, the adversary has no information about the
encoded subspace evasive sets element, s, and so the AMD
codeword SE(x, r, t) = s. This means that the adversary’s
error, (∆xi = x
′−x,∆ri = r′−r,∆ti = t′− t), is indepen-
dent of (x, r, t). According to Lemma 1, the probability that a
tampered AMD codeword, (x′, r′, t′), passes the verification
is no more than uR+1qN .
Finally, we show the probability of decoding error is at
most δ ≤ v
D·v·log log v
qN . The list size is at most |S ∩ H| ≤
vD
′·v·log log v and, uR+ 1 ≤ u+ 1 = v2 + 1. So by using the
union bound and letting D = D′+3, the probability that some
(x′, r′, t′) 6= (x, r, t) in the decoded list passes the verification
t′ = f(x′, r′), is no more than v
D·v log log v
qN .
A. Secrecy Capacity
The achievable rate of the code family C = {CN}N∈N is
given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 (Achievable Rate of C): The information rate
of the AWTP code family C = {CN}N∈N for a (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel is R(C) = 1− ρr − ρw.
Proof: For a given small 0 < ξ < 12 , let the code
parameters be chosen as, ξ1 = ξ13 , v = 1/ξ1 and u = 1/ξ
2
1 .
Finally let, N0 > (1/ξ1)D/ξ1 log log 1/ξ1 where D > 0 is a
constant.
We have, starting from the right hand side of (8),
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
v
v−1 (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
=
1
ξ1 + 1
−
1
ξ1 + 1
1
1−ξ1
(R+ 3ξ21) + ρr
1− ξ1 + ξ21
(1)
≥
1
ξ1 + 1
−
1
1−ξ1
(R+ 3ξ21) + ρr
1 + ξ31
(2)
≥ 1− ξ1 − (
1
1 − ξ1
(R + 3ξ21) + ρr)
(3)
≥ 1− ξ1 − ((1 + 2ξ1)(R + 3ξ1) + ρr)
= 1− ξ1 − (R+ 11ξ1 + ρr)
= 1−R− ρr − 12ξ1
Here (1) is by multiplying the numerator and denominator
of the first term on the LHS by 1 − ξ1 and then ignoring
ξ21 and ξ31 in the denominators of the two terms, (2) is by
multiplying the numerator and denominator of the first term
in the outer parenthesis by 1+2ξ1, and then ignoring ξ1 in the
denominator, and (3) is from 11−ξ1 ≤ 1 + 2ξ1 since ξ1 ≤ 12 .
Hence the decoding condition (8) of AWTP code is satisfied
for,
ρw = 1−R− ρr − 12ξ1. (11)
and so, R(CN ) = 1− ρr − ρw − 12ξ1.
Now since ξ = 13ξ1, for any N > N0, the rate of the
AWTP code CN is
1
N
log|Σ| |M| = R(C
N ) = 1− ρr − ρw − 12ξ1
> 1− ρr − ρw − ξ = R(C)− ξ
and the probability of the decoding error is bounded as,
δ ≤ (1/ξ1)
D/ξ1 log log 1/ξ1q−N ≤ Nq−N ≤ ξ
This concludes that the achievable rate of AWTP code family
C is R(C) = 1− ρr − ρw.
The computational complexity of encoding is
O((N log q)2). The combined computational complexity
of the FRS decoding algorithm and subspace evasive sets
intersection algorithm is, Poly((1/ξ)D/ξ log log 1/ξ). An AMD
verification costs O((N log q)2), and so the total complexity
of the AWTP decoding is Poly(N).
Theorem 2: For any small ξ > 0, there is a (0, δ)-AWTP
code CN of length N for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, such that
the information rate is R(CN ) = 1−ρr−ρw−ξ, the alphabet
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size is |Σ| = O(q1/ξ2 ), and the decoding error is bounded
as, δ < q−O(N). The decoding computation is Poly(N). The
AWTP code family C = {CN}N∈N achieves secrecy capacity
C0 = R(C) = 1− ρr − ρw for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel.
VI. AWTP CODES AND 1-ROUND SMT
A. Secure Message Transmission (SMT)
A cryptographic primitive that is closely related to AWTP
model is SMT with a number of variations in definition and
setting. We only consider 1-round (ǫ, δ)-SMT protocols and a
definition of reliability first considered in [26].
In a 1-round (ǫ, δ)-SMT protocol a sender and a receiver in
a network, are connected by N vertex-disjoint paths, referred
to as wires. The goal is to enable sender to send a message
m ∈M with a probability distribution Pr(M), to the receiver
such that the receiver receives reliably and privately, where
δ and ǫ bound the error probability and loss of information,
respectively, as defined below. In SMT setting the adversary
A has unlimited computational power and can corrupt and
control a subset of wires: the adversary can eavesdrop, block
or modify what is sent over the corrupted wires. We consider
an adaptive threshold adversary that can corrupt at most t out
of the N wires.
A 1-round (ǫ, δ)-SMT protocol has two algorithms. A
probabilistic encoding algorithm SMTenc and a deterministic
decoding algorithm SMTdec. Let ViewA(SMTenc(m), rA)
denote the adversary’s view of the communication over the
t wires that have been corrupted, when message m has been
sent and the adversary’s randomness has been rA.
Definition 8: An (ǫSMT, δSMT)-Secure Message Transmis-
sion (SMT) protocol satisfies the following two properties:
• Secrecy: For any two messages m1,m2 ∈M,
Advds(SMTenc,ViewA)
△
=
max
m1,m2
SD(ViewA(SMTenc(m1), rA)
ViewA(SMTenc(m2), rA)) ≤ ǫSMT
• Reliability: Receiver R outputs the wrong message with
probability no more than δSMT.
Pr(MS 6= MR) ≤ δSMT
When it is clear from the context, we omit the subscript
“SMT” and simply use (ǫ, δ)-SMT.
A perfect SMT protocol has ǫSMT = 0 and δSMT = 0. It was
proved [26] that (ǫSMT, δSMT)-SMT for δSMT < 12 (1 − 1|M|),
is possible only if N ≥ 2t + 1 and 1-round (0, 0)-SMT is
possible only if N ≥ 3t + 1 [21]. Let Vi denote the set of
possible transmissions (also called transcripts) of each wire.
Transmission rate of an SMT protocol is defined τR(SMT) =
Total Length of transcript
Length of message
=
∑
i log |V1|
log |M| .
For 1-round (0, 0)-SMT protocols, the lower bound on
transmission rate is NN−3t [27], and for (0, δSMT)-SMT, the
bound is NN−2t [47]. 1-round (0, 0)-SMT and (0, δSMT)-
SMT protocols whose transmission rates asymptotically reach
O( NN−3t) and O(
N
N−2t ), respectively, are called transmission
optimal.
B. Relation between AWTP Code and SMT
(ǫ, δ)-AWTP codes are closely related to 1-round
(ǫSMT, δSMT)-SMT protocols. In the following we show
the relationship between the two primitives.
Definition 9 (Symmetric SMT): An SMT protocol is called
symmetric SMT if the protocol remains invariant under any
permutation of the wires.
Let (W i1 ,W i2 · · ·W iN ) denote the set of possible transmissions
on the N wires in an r-round SMT protocol. In a symmetric
protocol, for each round i, we have W ij = W, j = 1 · · ·N .
That is the set of possible transmissions on a wire, is indepen-
dent of the wire. All known constructions of SMT protocols
are symmetric.
Theorem 3: There is a one-to-one correspondence between
an (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code CN of length N that provides security
for a restricted AWTP channel with S = Sr = Sw, and a
1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT) symmetric SMT protocol for N wires
with security against a (t, N) threshold adversary.
Furthermore, an (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP chan-
nel can be used to construct a code for a restricted AWTP
channel, resulting in a 1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT) symmetric SMT.
Proof: Consider an (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code CN over a re-
stricted AWTP channel with S = Sr = Sw. By associating
each component of the code with a distinct wire, one can
construct a 1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT) symmetric SMT protocol for
N wires. The protocol security is against a threshold (t, N)
adversary with t = ρN . The SMT encoding and decoding
are obtained from the corresponding functions in the (ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code; that is, SMTenc(m, rS) = AWTPenc(m, rS)
and SMTdec(y) = AWTPdec(y). To relate the security and
reliability of the SMT protocol to those of the AWTP-code,
we note the following:
1) Definitions of privacy in the two primitives are both in
terms of the statistical distance of the adversary’s view
for two messages chosen by the adversary (Compare
definition 8 and definition 5).
2) Definitions of error in decoding for the two primitives
both requires the decoder to output the correct message
with probability at least 1− δ.
3) Adversary’s capabilities in the two models are the same.
The corruption of the codeword in (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code
is by an additive error, while in SMT the adversary
can arbitrarily modify the |S| = t wires. However
for restricted AWTP channels with S = Sr = Sw,
modifying t components (ci1 , · · · cit) to (c′i1 , · · · c
′
it
) is
equivalent to “adding” the error e with SUPP(e) = S
and (ei1 , · · · eit) = ((c′i1 − ci1), · · · (c
′
it
− cit)) and
so for these channels additive errors cover all possible
adversarial tampering.
The theorem follows by constructing a restricted (ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code with S = Sr = Sw from a 1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT)
symmetric SMT, using the same association of the code
components and the wires. We will have ǫ = ǫSMT and
δ = δSMT.
Corollary 3 below follows from the one-to-one correspon-
dence established in Theorem 3.
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Corollary 3: Let R(CN ) be the rate of an (ǫ, δ)-AWTP
code CN for a restricted AWTP channel. The transmission
rate of the associated 1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT) symmetric SMT
is given by, τR(SMT) = N log |V|log |M| =
1
R(CN )
.
The upper bound on the secrecy rate (Lemma 2) of (0, δ)-
AWTP codes for restricted AWTP channels, gives a lower
bound on the transmission rate of 1-round (0, δSMT) symmetric
SMT protocols.
Theorem 4: For a 1-round (ǫSMT, δSMT) symmetric SMT
protocol, transmission rate is lower bounded as,
τR(SMT) ≥
N
N − 2t+ 2tǫ(1 + log|V|
1
ǫ )
.
For ǫSMT = 0, the bounded reduces to the known bound,
τR(SMT) ≥
N
N−2t [47].
Proof: Using Theorem 2, for a 1-round (ǫ, δ) symmetric
SMT over N wires with t = ρN , there is a corresponding
(ǫ, δ)-AWTP code for a restricted AWTP channel with S =
Sr = Sw whose information rate is upper bounded by,
R(CN ) ≤ 1− 2ρ+ 2ǫρ(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
)
Since the transmission rate of an (ǫ, δ) symmetric SMT proto-
col is the inverse of the information rate of the corresponding
(ǫ, δ)-AWTP code, we have
τR(SMT) =
1
R(CN )
≥
1
1− 2ρ+ 2ǫρ(1 + log|V|
1
ǫ )
=
N
N − 2t+ 2tǫ(1 + log|V|
1
ǫ )
It has been proved [26] that for 1-round (ǫ, δ)-SMT protocols
for δ ≤ 12 (1−
1
|M|) can be constructed only if, N ≥ 2t+ 1.
Corollary 4: For N = 2t+ 1, we will have,
τR(SMT) =
1
R(CN )
≥
2t+ 1
1 + 2tǫ(1 + log|V|
1
ǫ )
This is the first and the only known lower bound on the
transmission rate of (ǫ, δ) symmetric SMT protocols. Using
a similar approach one can obtain an alternative proof for the
known lower bound on the transmission rate of 1-round (0, δ)
symmetric SMT protocols (Theorem 10, [47])
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We proposed a model for active adversaries in wiretap
channels, derived secrecy capacity and gave an explicit con-
struction for a family of capacity achieving codes. The model
is a natural extension of Wyner wiretap models when the
adversary is a powerful active adversary that uses its par-
tial observation of the communication channel to introduce
adversarial noise in the channel. The adversary’s view of
communication is the same as wiretap II model. However
unlike noiseless main channel in wiretap II, we allow the
main channel to be corrupted by the adversary inline with the
corruption introduced by the adversary in Hamming’s model of
reliable communication. This is the first model of adversarial
wiretap where the adversary’s view is used by the adversary for
forming its adversarial noise. All previous work (See Section
I-B) assume the view of the the eavesdropper does not affect
the noise added to the channel.
AWTP model provides a framework for studying SMT which
so far has been studied independent of wiretap model. The
fruitfulness of this was demonstrated by deriving a new lower
bound on the transmission rate of 1-round (ǫ, δ) symmetric
SMT protocols. It is an interesting question if this bound
applies to all SMT protocols. That is if allowing different
transcript set would increase the bound.
In the discussion part of Section 1, we listed a number of
open questions that will improve our results. More general
settings such as allowing interaction between the sender and
the receiver, as well as variations in the adversarial power
including considering adversarial and probabilistic noise both,
will be interesting directions for future work. Another impor-
tant direction for future work is the study of key agreement
problem over an AWTP channel.
APPENDIX A
SUBSPACE EVASIVE SETS
A. Encoding Algorithm
We show the encoding map SE : v → s. Assuming there
is a vector v of length n1 and (w − v)|n1. First we divide
the vector into n1w−v blocks. Then for each block vi for i =
1, · · · , n1w−v , we encode into a block si using bijection ϕ. Then
we concatenate each block si for i = 1, · · · , n1w−v and generate
s in S. We give the function ϕ in the following.
Lemma 12: (Claim 4.1) Assume that at least v of the degree
d1, · · · , dv are co-prime to |F| − 1. Then there is an easy to
compute bijection ϕ : Fw−v → VF ⊂ Fw. Moreover, there
are w− v coordinates in the output of ϕ that can be obtained
from the identity mapping Id : Fw−v → Fw−v.
Let dj1 , · · · , djv be the degree among d1, · · · , dw co-prime
to |F| − 1 and let J = {j1, · · · , jv} and x
dji
ji
= yi. On the
positions [w]\J , the map ϕ takes the elements from Fw−v to
F
[w]\J
. For the elements on J , there is∑
j∈J
Ai,jx
dj
j = −
∑
j /∈J
Ai,jx
dj
j
Let A′ be the v × v minor of A given by restricting A to
columns in J and bi = −
∑
j /∈J Ai,jx
dj
j . Then
A′y = b
and for each y, there is unique solution of xdjiji = yi mod q
because dji is co-prime to q − 1.
The computational complexity of mapping each vector vi
into si is Poly(v). Since v is consisted by b = nw vectors, the
total computational complexity of encoding a vector into an
element in subspace evasive sets is Poly(n).
B. Intersection Algorithm
We show how to compute the intersection S ∩ H given
(v, ℓ) subspace evasive sets S and v-dimension subspace H.
The subspace evasive sets S will filter out the elements in H
and output a set of elements S ∩H with size no more than ℓ.
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Because H is v-dimensional subspace and H ⊂ Fn, there
exists a set of affine maps {ℓ1, · · · , ℓn} such that for any el-
ements x = {x1, · · · , xm} ∈ H, there is xi = ℓi(s1, · · · , sv).
We show the result by induction of the number of blocks
i = 1, · · · , n/w. If i = 1, let H1 := {(x1, · · · , xw) :
(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ H}, the dimension of H1 is r1 ≤ v and
Hx1,··· ,xw = {(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ H : (x1, · · · , xw)} such
that H = ∪(x1,··· ,xw)∈H1Hx1,··· ,xw , and the dimension of
Hx1,··· ,xw is v − r1. There is
VF(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1
= {(x1, · · · , xw) = (ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) :
f1(ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) = 0, · · · ,
fv(ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) = 0}
We can solve the v equations to get (s1, · · · , sv) and then
obtain (x1, · · · , xw). Since H1 ⊂ Fw,
VF(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1 = V(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1
By Bezout’s theorem, there is |V(f1, · · · , fv)∩H1| ≤ (d1)r1 .
So there are at most (d1)r1 solutions for (x1, · · · , xw) ∈ H1.
The computational time of solving the equation system follows
from powerful algorithms that can solve a system of polyno-
mial equations (over finite fields) in time polynomial in the
size of the output, provided that the number of solutions is
finite in the algebraic closure (i.e the zero-dimensional case).
So for i = 1, there are (d1)r1 solutions for (x1, · · · , xw). The
computational time is at most Poly((d1)r1).
For every fixed of the first w coordinates, we reduce the
dimension of H and obtained a new subspace on the re-
maining coordinates. By induction, we have |V(f1, · · · , fv)∩
Hx1,··· ,xw | ≤ (d1)
r−r1 for all (x1, · · · , xw) ∈ H1. Hence
there is |V(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H| ≤ (d1)r.
Similarly, we can compute all the solutions in times
Poly((d1)
r1)·Poly((d1)r2) · · ·Poly((d1)rn/w), where r1+r2+
· · · + rn/w = v. So the running time of decoding algorithm
is Poly((d1)v). Since d1 can be bounded by d1 ≤ vD log log v
(Claim 4.3 [22]) with constant D, the total running time for
the intersection algorithm is Poly(vD·v log log v).
APPENDIX B
LIST DECODABLE CODE
A. Decoding algorithm of FRS code
Linear algebraic list decoding [31] has two main steps:
interpolation and message finding as outlined below.
• Find a polynomial, Q(X,Y1, · · · , Yv) = A0(X) +
A1(X)Y1 + · · · + Av(X)Yv, over Fq such that
deg(Ai(X)) ≤ D, for i = 1 · · · v, and deg(A0(X)) ≤
D + k − 1, satisfying Q(αi, yi1 , yi2 , · · · , yiv ) = 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n0, where n0 = (u− v + 1)N .
• Find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree at most k−
1, with coefficients f0, f1 · · · fk−1, that satisfy, A0(X)+
A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+· · ·+Av(X)f(γv−1X) =
0, by solving linear equation system.
The two above requirements are satisfied if f ∈ Fq[X ] is
a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 whose FRS encoding
agrees with the received word y in at least t components:
t > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uR
u− v + 1
)
This means we need to find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ]
of degree at most k − 1, with coefficients f0, f1, · · · , fk−1,
that satisfy,
A0(X) +A1(X)f(X) +A2(X)f(γX) + · · ·
+Av(X)f(γ
v−1X) = 0
Let us denote Ai(X) =
∑D+k−1
j=0 ai,jX
j for 0 ≤ i ≤ v.
(ai,j = 0 when i ≥ 1 and j ≥ D). Define the polynomials,

B0(X) = a1,0 + a2,0X + a3,0X
2 + · · ·+ av,0X
v−1
.
.
.
Bk−1(X) = a1,k−1 + a2,k−1X + a3,k−1X
2 + · · ·
+ av,k−1X
v−1
We examine the condition that the coefficients of X i of the
polynomial Q(X) = A0(X)+A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+
· · ·+Av(X)f(γv−1X) = 0 equals 0, for i = 0 · · · k− 1. This
is equivalent to the following system of linear equations for
f0 · · · fk−1.


B0(γ
0) 0 0 · · · 0
B1(γ
0) B0(γ
1) 0 · · · 0
B2(γ
0) B1(γ
1) B0(γ
2) · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bk−1(γ
0) Bk−2(γ
1) Bk−3(γ
2) · · · B0(γk−1)


×


f0
f1
f2
.
.
.
fk−1

 =


−a0,0
−a0,1
−a0,2
.
.
.
−a0,k−1


(12)
The rank of the matrix of (Eqs. 12) is at least k−v+1 because
there are at most v − 1 solutions of equation B0(X) = 0 so
at most v − 1 of γi that makes B0(γi) = 0. The dimension
of solution space is at most v − 1 because the rank of matrix
of (Eqs. 12) is at least k − v + 1. So there are at most qv−1
solutions to (Eqs. 12) and this determines the size of the list
which is equal to qv−1.
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